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Indigenous Self-government? 
An Assessment of the Nisga’a 
Treaty Agreement
JACOB WEBSTER
Over the course of Canadian history, Indigenous peoples have endured a difficult relationship with the state. This relationship is indicative of the 
history of colonialism in Canada and continues be 
problematic in contemporary interactions between 
Canadian First Nations and the federal and provincial 
governments. The question of how Indigenous peoples 
fit into the Canadian federal system is a complex one 
whose answer depends largely on the specific contextual 
situation of each First Nations group. In this essay, I 
argue that the Nisga’a Treaty1 agreement exemplifies a 
commendable attempt at Indigenous self-government, 
which is consistent with the principles evoked in the 
Charlottetown Accord2 and in the scholarship on 
Indigenous self-government. In this way, the Nisga’a 
treaty sets up a model for Indigenous self-government 
that does not require constitutional change and is thus 
possible in the current constitutional context. The 
Nisga’a Treaty has withstood two judicial challenges 
and was informed by current constitutional principles 
(Aldridge and Fenge, 2015, 149). Because of its 
affirmed constitutionality, the Nisga’a Treaty provides 
a way forward within the current federal framework 
and provides a replicable example for First Nations. In 
order to argue that the Nisga’a Treaty creates a model 
for Indigenous self-government that is consistent with 
the theoretical ideals of Indigenous self-government, I 
first outline the principles evoked by the Charlottetown 
Accord and by scholars in the field of Indigenous self-
government. I then summarize the text of the Nisga’a 
agreement, identifying relevant sections that coincide 
or potentially conflict with the theoretical principles 
proposed in the first section. In order to conduct a more 
fulsome examination of the Nisga’a agreement, I also 
examine recent studies that endeavor to evaluate the 
success of the Nisga’a agreement based on its practical 
implementation in the community, not simply on the 
text of the agreement. By examining the text and the 
practical implementation of the agreement, I argue that 
the Nisga’a treaty agreement provides the framework for 
Indigenous self-government in a way that is consistent 
with the theoretical principles identified by the 
Charlottetown Accord and certain scholars. The Nisga’a 
treaty is a sound implementation of Indigenous self-
government that is possible without any constitutional 
change.
Theoretical Principles
In identifying the opinions of scholars on the principles 
of Indigenous self-government, it is necessary to 
identify the vein in the literature that proposes that 
negotiations between settler government and native 
peoples are inherently colonial. This method of thinking 
1 Signed on 27 May 1998, the Nisga’a Treaty was negotiated and 
signed by the Nisga’a nation, the Province of British Columbia and 
the Government of Canada, ostensibly to settle outstanding land 
claims. It went into effect on 11 May 2000.
2 The Charlottetown Accord was a package of proposed 
amendments to the Canadian Constitution that were considered 
by the provinces of Canada and the Canadian federal government 
in 1992, but was ultimately rejected. Among the reforms was a 
proposal to enshrine an Aboriginal right to self-government in the 
Constitution.
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provides little room for negotiation or compromise, but 
identifying this viewpoint is important. Paul Rynard’s 
work is emblematic of this critique of settler-Indigenous 
relations. Rynard generally disapproves of the Nisga’a 
agreement arguing that it does not represent a break 
from the past in the sense that it follows the same 
colonial channels of settler-Indigenous relations (2000). 
Furthermore, Rynard argues that the land negotiations 
between the Nisga’a and the state perpetuate a legal 
relationship of dependence of First Nations on the state 
that is inherently colonial (Rynard, 2000 p.240). While 
this critique is important and should be identified, 
it is not emblematic of other larger themes within 
the literature and precludes any state-First Nations 
agreement to help install self-government within the 
current constitutional structure. Rynard’s principles are 
valuable but are largely unrealistic given the unlikelihood 
of broad constitutional change.
While Rynard’s critique and principles are 
unrealistic given the current constitutional regime, 
the Charlottetown Accord and the work of other 
scholars present their own frameworks that are more 
practically suitable for an assessment of the Nisga’a treaty 
agreement. 
While the Charlottetown Accord failed in a 
national referendum in 1992, it nonetheless identified 
guiding principles for what its authors proposed as a 
“third order” of government. The Accord states that 
the Indigenous peoples of Canada, due to their status 
as the first peoples of Canada, have a right to govern 
their land and to promote their languages, cultures 
and traditions (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, S.2(b)). 
It further identifies their right to govern their own 
economies, identities and institutions (Charlottetown 
Accord, 1985, p.A s.4). It also states that the provincial 
and federal governments have a duty to negotiate 
with Indigenous peoples on issues of jurisdiction and 
on the use of resources and assets on Native lands 
(Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p.B s.45). Finally, it states 
that the financing of these self-government agreements 
should be negotiated in a way that promotes equal 
opportunity and furthers social, economic, and cultural 
development (Charlottetown Accord, 1985, p. B s.50). 
The Charlottetown Accord, despite its failure, identified 
certain key policy areas, notably culture, identity, and 
institutions that should frame any assessment of an 
Indigenous self-government regime.
Scholarship on Indigenous self-government 
further clarifies the vision set forth in the Charlottetown 
Accord. Dan Russell identifies the Penner Report3 as 
the impetus for self-government and the importance 
of its recommendations for “expanded jurisdiction of 
first nations governments, the exclusion of provincial 
jurisdiction from Indigenous lands, and a process of First 
Nations accountability to Indigenous people” (2000, 
7). Furthermore, he argues that if self-government has 
any content at all it must mean the ability to enact 
laws concerning crime, health care, and education all 
enforceable by Indigenous courts (Russell, 2000, 11). 
In this argument, Russell asserts that First Nations 
governments must have their own judicial enforcement 
mechanisms to execute their own legislation.
3 In 1983, a Special Parliamentary Committee on Indian Self-
government released The Penner Report, named after its chairman, 
Keith Penner, a Liberal Member of Parliament for Cochrane-
Superior. The Report recommended that Canada’s Indian Act 
and the Department of Indian Affairs be phased out  gradually 
and replaced by local governments established by Native peoples 
themselves.
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Wayne Warry takes a different approach to 
Indigenous self-government, proposing that it should 
be up to the First Nations groups to determine the 
legitimate parameters of self-government (1998, 36). 
He argues that self-government is an iterative process 
in which its meaning becomes clearer through its 
implementation and practice (1998, 49). Warry’s 
approach differs greatly from Russell’s and he seeks to 
grant agency to Indigenous peoples in their specific 
contexts to determine what their legitimate form of self-
government will mean given the needs of their individual 
communities. Warry does not provide criteria in the 
way Russell does, but nonetheless helps inform what 
Indigenous self-government would look like in saying 
that it recognizes the right and ability of individuals and 
communities to conduct their own affairs (1998, 50).
Tim Schouls provides further clarity to the 
question of what Indigenous self-government will and 
ought to mean on the ground. Firstly, he states that self-
government should be principally to preserve Indigenous 
culture (Schouls, 2003, 45). While cultural preservation 
should be the chief concern of any self-government 
regime, Schouls clarifies by stating, “Self government is 
understood to be fundamentally about the expression 
of an Indigenous desire for control over internal affairs” 
(2003, 178). This is an important stipulation in Schouls’ 
statement as it implies a degree of autonomy from the 
Canadian state that extends the tribe’s authority only 
to members of the tribe and to matters that are internal 
to their own community. In this, Schouls argues for a 
degree of separation between Indigenous communities 
and the Canadian state. 
Viewed together, the Charlottetown Accord 
and the scholarly literature on the topic help clarify 
what Indigenous self-government should look like 
on the ground. The guiding principle identified in 
all the sources is Indigenous control over Indigenous 
affairs, and a distancing from the federal and provincial 
governments from business that is internal to First 
Nations communities. More specifically, self-government 
agreements ought to include provisions for Indigenous 
control over language, culture, economy, identity, 
institutions, traditions, and land. Furthermore, as 
Russell asserts, these agreements ought to include 
enforcement mechanisms, whether they be courts or 
other institutions, to enforce laws made by Indigenous 
governments. After outlining his principles, Russell 
asserts that the real question is not what Indigenous self-
government ought to look like, but “can it be done?” 
(2000, 89). By examining the Nisga’a Treaty, I argue that 
Russell’s question can be answered in the affirmative.
The Nisga’a Treaty Agreement
The Nisga’a Treaty agreement is the first modern-
day treaty in British Columbia and in this it is novel 
(Cassidy, 2004, 5). Given its novelty, it is imperative 
to adjudicate the success of this paradigm based on the 
theoretical principles identified in the preceding section. 
In adjudicating the success of the agreement, I break 
up my analysis into criteria identified in the literature 
on self-government. The eight categories provided in 
the literature to judge the success of the Nisga’a Treaty 
are: general provisions, government structure, social 
services, the judiciary, language and culture, lands and 
assets, citizenship, and financing. By identifying how the 
treaty addresses Nisga’a government on these issues and 
adjudicating them based on the criteria established by 
the relevant literature, it is possible to ascertain the value 
of the Nisga’a agreement. Any study of the Nisga’a treaty 
that ignores the actual text of the agreement would be 
incomplete. Based largely on the text of the agreement, 
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in this section I assess how well it fits with the criteria 
established in the Charlottetown Accord and the relevant 
scholarship.
Chapter two of the Nisga’a agreement sets out 
certain general conditions that help frame it. Firstly, the 
agreement does not alter the Constitution of Canada 
and exists within the meaning of Sections 25 and 35 of 
the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada et. al. ch.2 s.1). The 
Charter will still apply to Nisga’a governments, bearing 
in mind “the free and democratic nature of Nisga’a 
Government” (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.2 s.9). Finally, 
while federal and provincial laws will still apply to the 
Nisga’a, in the event of a conflict between these laws and 
the agreement, the agreement will prevail (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch.2 s.13). These principles set the groundwork 
for the rest of the agreement and support the supremacy 
of the self-government agreement over any piece of 
provincial or federal legislation. 
One key principle identified in the literature 
is that Indigenous governments ought to have control 
over their institutions and governmental structures. 
The agreement addresses this. The Nisga’a have the 
jurisdiction to make laws concerning the establishment 
of Nisga’a institutions (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11, s. 
34). This includes the composition of their government, 
its financial administration, and the conduct of 
elections and referenda. The provisions for the Nisga’a 
constitution enumerated in Chapter 11, Section Nine 
are relatively vague, allowing for Nisga’a autonomy in 
these areas. For example, while it mandates that the 
Nisga’a provide a mechanism for challenging Nisga’a 
laws it does not codify what this mechanism should 
look like or establish a settler standard to which it 
should conform (Canada et al.). In this way, it sets up 
guiding principles but leaves the practical administration 
of these issues up to the Nisga’a and their members. 
This method of structuring the Nisga’a government 
allows for a relatively high degree of Nisga’a autonomy, 
which is consistent with notions in the literature of 
self-government as a process that must be determined 
by Indigenous communities themselves.  Furthermore, 
the Nisga’a right to self-government is constitutionally 
entrenched through this treaty, which means that 
it cannot be ignored by the province or the federal 
government (Cassidy, 2004, 8). The structure of the 
Nisga’a government in general conforms to the standards 
evoked by the literature by recognizing self-government 
as an iterative process that is valuable to the extent that 
First Nations groups have the autonomy to determine 
their own internal constitutional structures.
The way the Nisga’a agreement addresses social 
services provides an illustrative criterion by which 
to judge the degree to which the agreement is self-
government. Generally speaking, the Nisga’a can make 
laws creating social services (Canada et. al, 1999, ch. 11 
s. 78). More specifically, the province and the federal
government have a responsibility to negotiate with the 
Nisga’a on the administration and delivery of federal 
and provincial social services by the Nisga’a themselves 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.78). This provision is 
integral to the meaning of self-government because it 
provides Nisga’a control over aspects of government 
that are central to the well-being of Nisga’a members. 
Furthermore, the agreement specifically addresses health 
care, stating that the Nisga’a and the governments 
will negotiate to reach agreement for health care for 
individuals on the reserve, and in the instance that any 
Nisga’a law regarding the structure or organization of 
health services on Nisga’a lands contravenes federal or 
provincial law, Nisga’a law will prevail (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch.11 s.84). Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the 
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ability to regulate Indigenous healers on the reserve, 
however they cannot regulate substances that are already 
regulated by the federal or provincial governments 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 86). This provision is 
mixed in terms of the degree to which it allows self-
government. Similarly mixed are the ways the agreement 
provides for education on reserve. While the Nisga’a can 
make laws regarding preschool to grade-12 education, 
which includes the teaching of Nisga’a language and 
culture, there are standards set forth by the province 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 100). Not only must 
the Nisga’a education system prepare its graduates 
to competently attend post-secondary education, it 
must also permit the transfer of students to provincial 
schools at each grade level (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 
11 s. 100). These provisions provide checks along the 
way on Nisga’a education that reduce the ability of the 
Nisga’a to innovate. But generally, Nisga’a language 
and culture can be taught concurrently with provincial 
standards provided students in each grade can achieve 
at similar levels to students at provincially operated 
schools. The vernacular surrounding the standards 
by which the Nisga’a must conform to the province’s 
regulation is very important in determining the 
degree of Nisga’a autonomy. In terms of Nisga’a post-
secondary institutions, the Treaty calls only for standards 
“comparable” to those of the province on issues of 
organization, admissions, instructor qualifications, 
and curriculum (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 104). 
Since Nisga’a standards need only be comparable to the 
province’s, there is a degree of autonomy in this domain. 
Overall, the provisions for social services in the Nisga’a 
agreement are generally amenable to the principles 
identified in the literature and provide for a system that 
gives the Nisga’a a relatively high degree of autonomy in 
regulating health services and education.
As Russell argues, Indigenous law enforcement 
is required for any Indigenous self-government regime 
to be legitimate (2000, 11). The Nisga’a treaty fulfils this 
requirement to a certain extent but falls down in certain 
key areas. The Nisga’a have the jurisdiction to make laws 
regulating or controlling actions on their land other 
than actions that are authorized by the Crown or actions 
that may constitute “nuisance, a trespass, a danger to 
public health, or a threat to public order, peace, or 
safety” (Canada et. al., ch.11 s. 59). The words in this 
section are relatively vague, which makes it difficult 
to adjudicate this section. Despite this ambiguity, the 
Nisga’a do not have the authority to create criminal law 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 61). This is a significant 
limit to Nisga’a judicial abilities. Furthermore, the 
Nisga’a may not regulate gambling on their lands, which 
is another infringement on the theoretical notions of 
self-government (Canada et. al, 1999, ch.11 s. 108). 
Despite these inadequacies in the treaty, Chapter 12, 
which describes the “Administration of Justice,” provides 
a clearer framework for Nisga’a judicial mechanisms. 
This chapter provides for the Nisga’a to create their own 
police force (Canada et. al. 1999, ch. 12 s.4). While the 
force must be in “substantial conformity” to provincial 
standards in terms of use of force by its officers and 
codes of conduct, the treaty provides for a large degree 
of autonomy in this area (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 
12 s.4). Furthermore, these police officers have all the 
powers and responsibilities of peace officers under the 
law (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.12 s.13). There is also a 
reciprocal system whereby provincial police officers must 
notify the Nisga’a police forces if they are performing 
their duties in Nisga’a territory and vice versa (Canada 
et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.14-15). These sections set up a 
notion of equality between the two police forces, which 
symbolizes the equal status of the Nisga’a and provincial 
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governments. Furthermore, the provisions whereby the 
police force must be in substantial conformity with the 
provinces provide not so much a limit on police power 
as they do protection of citizens’ rights.
Not only can the Nisga’a establish a police 
force with a relative degree of autonomy they are also 
capable of establishing a system of courts provided they 
comply with “generally recognized principles in respect 
of judicial fairness, independence and impartiality 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 12 s.33). This section sets 
forth criteria that are theoretical and non-specific, 
which gives the Nisga’a a large degree of autonomy 
in terms of the structure of their judicial system. This 
autonomy affirms the theoretical principles of self-
government. Furthermore, the Nisga’a courts have 
powers that are relatively far reaching. They can review 
Nisga’a institutions, adjudicate based on Nisga’a law, and 
adjudicate disputes within the jurisdiction of provincial 
courts provided it is on Nisga’a land and involves Nisga’a 
people. While the Nisga’a are unable to make criminal 
law and are limited in their legislative ability on certain 
other legal issues, the Treaty does set up enforcement 
mechanisms that afford the Nisga’a a large degree of 
autonomy. While the judicial set-up under the Nisga’a 
agreement may not totally fulfil Russell’s criteria, it does 
a respectable job in setting up autonomy for Nisga’a 
courts and police forces to enforce Nisga’a law in Nisga’a 
territory. 
The criterion that is mentioned most commonly 
in the literature as a litmus test for self-government is 
the degree to which the Indigenous governments are 
autonomous in matters of culture. On this issue, the 
Nisga’a agreement is relatively strong. The agreement 
states outright that “Nisga’a language and culture are 
matters that should be subject to Nisga’a laws and 
governments, to as great an extent as possible” (Cassidy, 
2004, 19). The Nisga’a have the authority to make laws 
that promote and preserve their culture and language 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41). Specifically, this 
clause allows the Nisga’a to pass laws to authorize the 
use, reproduction, and representation of Nisga’a cultural 
symbols and practices, and the teaching of Nisga’a 
language (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 11 s.41).  While 
this provision is broad and gives the Nisga’a a large 
degree of autonomy, it does not allow the Nisga’a to 
legislate regarding intellectual property (Canada et. al., 
1999 ch.11 s.42). On this issue, the treaty is potentially 
lacking in terms of its protection of Nisga’a culture but 
other sections provide the Nisga’a with greater power. 
For instance, the Nisga’a can control the devolution 
of cultural property for people who die intestate and 
Nisga’a governments can make laws forcing employers 
to accommodate Nisga’a employees based on aspects of 
Nisga’a culture (Canada et al., 1999, ch. 11 s. 115-16). 
These provisions give the Nisga’a government control 
over cultural materials and give Nisga’a residents a 
greater ability to practice their culture. Chapter 17 sets 
out the procedures by which the Nisga’a can reclaim 
Nisga’a artifacts from the Canadian Museum of History 
and the Royal British Columbia Museum. Chapter nine 
also sets out provisions for the traditional Nisga’a harvest 
of wildlife in the Nass Wildlife Reserve subject only to 
provincial legislation for public health and conservation 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.1). This provision does 
not require the Nisga’a to obtain hunting licenses 
(Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 17 s.10). These provisions 
allow for the reclamation of cultural artifacts and the 
practice of traditional Nisga’a hunting rituals that allow 
the Nisga’a to regulate their own traditional cultural 
practices. While the agreement does not delegate the 
ability to legislate based on state intellectual property 
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laws, it does delegate autonomy in other important areas 
and extends the Nisga’a ability to control and practice 
their culture.
Like cultural considerations, issues concerning 
land assets are frequently mentioned by scholars 
identifying criteria by which to adjudicate Indigenous 
self-government. The agreement states that the Nisga’a 
can make laws regarding the use and management of 
their lands (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.44). These laws 
have a wide jurisdiction under Section 44 and include 
the right to control how land is disposed of on Nisga’a 
territory (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.11 S. 44,d). They have 
the ability to regulate business on their land and can 
zone, plan, and develop their land as they see fit (Canada 
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s.47). Furthermore, the same criteria 
for bird harvest in Chapter nine are made in Chapter 
eight for fish harvest. The Nisga’a have the right to fish 
on their lands subject only to provincial legislation on 
public health and conservation and do not require a 
government license (Canada et. al., 1999 , ch. 8 s.1, s.7). 
Generally speaking, the Nisga’a treaty allows for a large 
degree of autonomy in Nisga’a legislation on the use of 
Nisga’a land and resources. This is consistent with the 
criteria set out by the scholarship identified earlier. 
Citizenship—that is, who is Nisga’a and who is 
not—is an important part of any Indigenous agreement. 
The criteria for citizenship are set forth in Chapter 20 
of the agreement and are relatively restrictive. Nisga’a 
citizens must be of Nisga’a ancestry either by being 
born to a mother in the tribe, a descendant of such an 
individual, an adopted child of a woman in the tribe, 
or the spouse of one of said people (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch.9 S.1). These criteria are relatively restrictive 
because they are based on an ancestral link to the Nisga’a 
people. Furthermore, the Nisga’a have the authority 
to form an enrolment committee, one governed by 
rules set out by the Nisga’a council that will adjudicate 
cases of membership (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.9 s.11). 
This effectively allows the Nisga’a to regulate their 
membership and thus regulate access to Nisga’a lands 
and the privileges of Nisga’a citizenship. This internal 
mechanism whereby the Nisga’a can control membership 
is integral to a the safeguarding of all other Nisga’a rights 
under the agreement. There is an Appeal Board that 
adjudicates references from the Enrolment Committee 
and the appeals board is composed of Nisga’a and 
government officials in equal numbers (Canada et. 
al., 1999, s. 19 ch.9). The appeals process privileges 
the Nisga’a and allows for the pre-eminence of Nisga’a 
decision-making at all levels. It creates a framework of 
self-government that encourages Nisga’a autonomy in 
the critical area of membership.
While the agreement seems to satisfy notions 
of self-government in crucial areas defined by scholars, 
issues of financing are paramount to the practical 
implementation of this agreement. With regard to 
financing, the agreement sets forth a process that is very 
fair to the Nisga’a. Chapter 15 describes the financing 
agreement and states that every five years the parties 
agree to negotiate financing that would enable the 
agreed-upon public programs and services to Nisga’a 
residents at levels that are reasonably comparable to 
those in northwest British Columbia (Canada et. al., 
1999, ch. 15 s.3). This sets a relatively high standard 
by which the province and the federal government 
must provide financing to the Nisga’a government. 
Furthermore, these calculations will take into account 
the costs necessary to establish and operate the Nisga’a 
government, the effectiveness of public programs, the 
location of Nisga’a lands, training requirements, Nisga’a 
cultural values, and the obligations of the Nisga’a 
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government (Canada et. al., 1999, ch.15 s.9). This 
clause widens the scope of the financing arrangement 
taking into account important considerations that help 
ensure the ability of the Nisga’a government to operate. 
By taking into account the remoteness of Nisga’a 
lands and Nisga’a cultural values, the agreement is 
sensitive to the Nisga’a situation and helps facilitate self-
government. While the Nisga’a have the power to tax 
their own citizens (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.1), the 
Nisga’a are also subject to governmental taxes—federal 
and provincial (Canada et. al., 1999, ch. 16 s.6). The 
subjection to governmental taxes is one that contravenes 
the Indian Act but does not contravene the jurisdiction 
of the Nisga’a government. In this way, while it may 
be less than ideal for Nisga’a residents, taxation is not 
necessarily an issue that lessens the degree to which the 
agreement fulfils the notion of self-government. 
Based on the text of the agreement, the Nisga’a 
treaty fulfils to a large extent the theoretical principles 
identified in the literature on self-government. The 
Nisga’a have prevailing jurisdiction in several substantial 
areas including government, citizenship, culture, 
language, lands and assets, the organization and 
structure of health services, child and family services, 
and education (Cassidy, 2004, 10). Furthermore, the 
agreement clarifies that the Nisga’a have the authority 
to make laws that are necessarily incidental to exercising 
their authority as set out by the agreement (Canada 
et. al., 1999, ch.11 s. 126). While occasionally the 
agreement stipulates that the state can regulate Nisga’a 
government or that the Nisga’a cannot legislate on 
certain issues, the agreement largely fulfils the theoretical 
principles evoked in the relevant literature. In this 
way, the Nisga’a acquire law-making authority in the 
crucial areas of “lands, language, culture, education, 
health, child protection, traditional healing practices, 
fisheries, wildlife, forestry, environmental protection, 
and policing” (Allen, 2004, 235). While the actual text 
of the agreement is consistent with the principles of 
Indigenous self-government, the practical reality of how 
the agreement is implemented is just as (if not more) 
important.
A 2010 study by Joseph Quesnel and Conrad 
Winn reports mixed results as to the effect of the 
agreement on the quality of governance within the 
Nisga’a community. They find that the funding from 
the government is sufficient for the operation of Nisga’a-
run programs and that there is higher trust for the local 
Nisga’a government than neighboring bands have for 
their own governmental arrangements (Quesnel et. 
al., 2011, 9). Despite this seemingly positive feedback, 
they find no improvement in public opinion over the 
government’s ability to keep promises, though there are 
large concerns about nepotism among Nisga’a leadership 
(Quesnel et. al., 2011, 11-12). Furthermore, they state 
that there is difficulty for many members of the group 
to live outside of the Indian Act framework (Quesnel 
et. al., 2011, 16). Despite these mixed results, what we 
understand as good government and as self-government 
should not be conflated. While the immediate results of 
the agreement are mixed as to their impact on improving 
governance, the agreement provides a workable 
framework for Nisga’a self-government, which is an 
essentially positive goal. While the short-term effects 
of self-government in the Nisga’a community may be 
mixed, the creation of a workable regime for Indigenous 
self-government within the current constitutional 
framework is a notable accomplishment and a step 
toward Indigenous self-government on a larger scale 
that, as the literature demonstrates, is an essential step in 
the advancement of Canadian Indigenous peoples. 
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In conclusion, the question of how Indigenous 
peoples should rightly interact with the state is one 
that has prompted a vast amount of scholarship and 
political discussion. The Nisga’a Treaty provides the 
framework for an answer to the question of how 
Canadian First Nations fit into the federal system. The 
Nisga’a agreement does not provide for self-government 
on every issue and, in some areas, there are standards 
imposed by the provincial and federal governments. 
But in most areas, the agreement mostly adheres to the 
theoretical ideals proposed in the Charlottetown Accord 
and in literature on self-government. While theory is 
useful for crafting frameworks, policy that is negotiated 
by three “orders” of government is rarely ideal. In this 
way, the Nisga’a agreement provides a valuable example 
for how Indigenous self-government can be realized 
within the current constitutional framework to a degree 
that substantially conforms to theoretical ideals. While 
the practical implementation of the agreement has had 
mixed effects in its improvement of governance for the 
Nisga’a, good governance and self-government should 
not be conflated, and self-government is a goal unto 
itself for Indigenous peoples in Canada.  While the 
Nisga’a agreement is somewhat exceptional in that it 
was instituted in an environment made conducive to 
compromise by provincial and federal governments, it 
still provides a model for future negotiations (Cassidy, 
2004, 24). As Wayne Warry states, “Self-government 
is an emergent, iterative process—its meaning and 
validity become clearer with its practice” (1998, 49). 
In implementing the Nisga’a agreement, Canadian 
governments are supporting a forward-looking process 
that is consistent with theoretical, ideal principles and 
workable in the current constitutional context.
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